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Abstract
Three experiments examined the eVects of temporal attention and aging on masked repetition
and categorical priming for numbers and words. Participants’ temporal attention was manipulated
by varying the stimulus onset asynchrony (i.e., constant or variable SOA). In Experiment 1, partic-
ipants performed a parity judgment task and a lexical decision task in which categorical priming
and repetition priming were, respectively, tested. Experiment 2 used a semantic categorization task
testing categorical priming. In Experiment 3, repetition and categorical priming were tested in the
same semantic categorization task with the same stimuli. The results of the three experiments
showed that masked repetition priming is insensitive to manipulations of temporal attention
whereas categorical priming is. Furthermore, no diVerences were found between young and older
adults in repetition priming eVects, again contrasting with the categorical priming results for which
older adults were more sensitive to attentional manipulations than young adults.
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1. Introduction
Stimuli presented below the threshold of conscious awareness can inXuence
human behavior. One demonstration of this general phenomenon is subliminal prim-
ing, obtained when a prime stimulus, brieXy presented (typically less than 50ms) and
masked by a string of characters, precedes a target stimulus on which participants
have to make a judgment (e.g., decide whether it is a word or a non word). Subliminal
priming eVects can be obtained when the prime and the target are the same word
(repetition priming) or when prime and target refer to the same category (categorical
priming). In repetition priming, participants are faster to process targets when prime
and target are the same word compared to diVerent words (Bar & Biederman, 1999;
Bodner & Masson, 1997; Forster & Davis, 1984; Grainger, Diependaele, Spinelli,
Ferrand, & Farioli, 2003; Karayanidis, Andrews, Ward, & McConaghy, 1993; Mat-
sumoto, Iidaka, Nomura, & Ohira, 2005; Segui & Grainger, 1990). In categorical
priming, targets are responded to faster when prime and target belong to the same
category (e.g., “living things”) as compared to when prime and target are from diVer-
ent categories (Abrams, Klinger, & Greenwald, 2002; Forster, 2004). Subliminal
priming eVects have been found with word targets but also with pictures (e.g.,
Dell’Acqua & Grainger, 1999) and with numbers (e.g., Dehaene et al., 1998; Rey-
nvoet, Caessens, & Brysbaert, 2002). They have also been found in varying popula-
tions such as young and older adults (Fabre & Lemaire, 2005).
A long-standing debate concerns the type of processing undergone by stimuli that
are brieXy presented below the threshold of conscious awareness. One important
issue in this debate is whether or not such processing is entirely automatic, or
whether on the contrary it can be modulated by external factors, such as attention
and context. A review of the literature suggests that the answer to this question might
depend on the type of subliminal priming that is studied. The general consensus
among researchers examining masked repetition priming (generally for word stimuli)
is that these eVects are automatic (Forster, 1999; Forster & Davis, 1984; Jacobs &
Grainger, 1992; Kouider & Dupoux, 2001, 2005; Marcel, 1980; Neumann & Klotz,
1994; Segui & Grainger, 1990). Forster and Davis (1984) and others after them, have
accounted for masked repetition priming eVects obtained with word stimuli in terms
of automatic lexical processing initiated on the prime stimulus that transfers to pro-
cessing of targets. It is assumed that the absence of prime awareness prevents the
involvement of episodic and strategic factors. However, some authors (e.g., Bodner &
Masson’s, 1997 resource-retrieval account of masked repetition priming), have
argued that repetition priming can be modulated by episodic and strategic factors.
Recent research on subliminal categorical priming eVects has converged on the
idea that such priming is subject to attentional modulation. In a seminal study, Nacc-
ache, Blandin, and Dehaene (2002) observed that the occurrence of subliminal prim-
ing in a number comparison task was inXuenced by the allocation of temporal
attention to the time window during which the prime-target pair was presented. TheyL. Fabre et al. / Cognition 105 (2007) 513–532 515
tested the allocation of temporal attention on unconscious masked priming with a
number comparison task (i.e., participants had to compare a number with a Wxed
standard of 5). Prime and target stimuli were single-digit arabic numbers. Prime stim-
uli were presented for 29ms and masked by geometric Wgures. They tested three
diVerent conditions. In the Wrst condition, Fixed Prime and Fixed Target (FPFT)
condition, primes and targets had Wxed onset. That is, on all trials, primes and targets
appeared 710 and 810ms, respectively, after trial onset. In the second condition,
Fixed Prime and Variable Target (FPVT) condition, primes appeared 710ms after
trial onset, and targets could appear 810, 1094, or 1449ms after trial onset. In the
third condition, Variable Prime and Fixed Target (VPFT) condition, prime onset
varied (i.e., 71, 426, or 710ms after trial onset), and target onset was Wxed at 810ms.
They observed priming eVects (i.e., RTs faster on congruent trials than on incongru-
ent trials) only on predictable target trials. These Wndings led Naccache et al. to con-
clude that unconscious processing depends on participants’ ability to focus their
temporal attention on the time window when the target appears (with the prime in
close temporal proximity).
In the present research, we provide an empirical extension of Naccache et al.’s
(2002) Wndings that we believe has signiWcant consequences for theories of subliminal
priming eVects and their possible domain speciWcity. The present study tested both
repetition and categorical priming eVects in two diVerent stimulus domains (i.e.,
numerical and lexical) with the same participants. In repetition priming, eVects are
likely to be located at a level of processing where the unique nominal identity of a
given stimulus is determined (e.g., a lexical representation for a speciWc word). In cat-
egorical priming, once the prime stimulus has been identiWed (as a speciWc word or
number, for example) the appropriate superordinate category information must also
be activated in order to generate priming eVects. As a consequence, we hypothesize
that categorical priming involves more processing, and arguably deeper processing,
than repetition priming (see Reynvoet, Gevers, & Caessens, 2005; for recent evidence
in favour of this hypothesis). Testing repetition and categorical priming eVects in
both arithmetic and lexical domains not only allowed us to test the generality of sub-
liminal priming eVects across domains, but also oVered us the opportunity to exam-
ine possible diVerential inXuences of attentional factors across domains. We
hypothesize that subliminal categorical priming not only involves automatic pro-
cesses but also involves a certain amount of processing that requires attention. Con-
cerning repetition priming, we hypothesize that priming eVects are independent of
attentional processes and involve only automatic processes. In sum, a clear prediction
emerges form our survey of prior research: Categorical priming should be aVected by
variations of temporal attention, but repetition priming should not.
To further test the hypothesized diVerence in attentional involvement in sublimi-
nal repetition and categorical priming, we tested a population with decreased atten-
tional resources. Older adults seem to be a good population to test the implication of
temporal attention in subliminal priming, as aging is known to negatively aVect
attention in general (see McDowd & Shaw, 2000; for a review), and temporal atten-
tion in particular (Bherer & Belleville, 2004). Subliminal categorical priming eVects in
young and older adults reported by Fabre and Lemaire (2005) are consistent with516 L. Fabre et al. / Cognition 105 (2007) 513–532
involvement of attention and helped further specify the locus of attention demands in
subliminal priming. Fabre and Lemaire recently tested young and older adults in a
parity judgment task with masked primes presented for 43ms. Participants pressed a
right or a left key to decide whether a target digit was odd or even. Targets were
either congruent (i.e., they had the same parity status as primes) or incongruent (i.e.,
even primes and odd targets or odd primes and even targets). Behavioral measures
revealed subliminal priming eVects in young (priming eVect: 15ms) and in older
adults (priming eVect: 20ms) (i.e., better performance for congruent than for incon-
gruent trials). No signiWcant interaction was observed between age and categorical
priming. Furthermore, event-related potentials (ERPs) showed age-related diVer-
ences in amplitude, timing, and scalp distribution for both congruent and incongru-
ent ERPs. The delayed electrophysiological signature of subliminal priming in older
adults is consistent with the hypothesis that subliminal priming eVects involve two
mechanisms, automatic activation of information (activation stage), preserved with
age, and decision-related components of priming, aVected by aging. Such a two-pro-
cess view of subliminal priming concurs with observed eVects of temporal attention
on subliminal priming eVects (Naccache et al., 2002) suggesting that some subliminal
priming is under attentional control (see also Kunde, Kiesel, & HoVmann, 2003). The
present study examines the inXuence of temporal attention on subliminal priming in
both young and older adults.
2. Experiment 1
Experiment 1 examined repetition priming and categorical priming in the
domains that are classically associated with such priming eVects – respectively, the
lexical and numerical domains. In this experiment, a group of young and a group
of older individuals were tested in both a parity judgment and a lexical decision
task. The parity judgment task tested categorical priming eVects and the lexical
decision task tested repetition priming eVects. In the parity judgment task, partic-
ipants had to decide whether a numerical target was odd or even. To test for cate-
gorical priming half the trials were congruent (i.e., prime and target had the same
parity) and half the trials were incongruent (i.e., prime was odd and target was
even or reverse). In the lexical decision task, participants were asked to classify
strings of letters as words or non-words. To test for repetition priming, half the
trials with word targets were repeated trials (i.e., prime and target were the same
word), and the other half were non-repeated trials. Temporal attention was
manipulated in the same way in both tasks. Following Naccache et al. (2002), two
conditions in which target presentation was predictable and one condition in
which it was not predictable were tested. In the two constant presentation condi-
tions, targets always appeared 1624ms after stimulus onset, while in the varying
presentation conditions targets appeared at randomly variable delays. It is
hypothesized that if attention is required only when primes have to be processed
beyond their nominal identity (i.e., categorized in some way), then repetition
priming would not be aVected by our manipulation of temporal attention inL. Fabre et al. / Cognition 105 (2007) 513–532 517
contrast to categorical priming. Finally, given the results of Fabre and Lemaire
(2005) we expected to observe categorical and repetition priming eVects in young
and older adults.
2.1. Method
2.1.1. Participants
Thirty seven students with a mean age of 22.3 years (range: 18–25 y.o.) and 37
older participants with a mean age of 74.8 years (range: 65–87 y.o.) were tested in par-
ity judgment and lexical decision tasks. Young adults were undergraduate students
from the University of Provence (Marseille, France) who received course credit for
their participation, and older adults were recruited from the community. All older
adults took the Mini-Mental State Examination (MMSE, Folstein, Folstein, &
McHugh, 1975) for potential dementia screening. All individuals had scores higher
than 27 (mean: 28.1). All participants had a normal or a corrected-to-normal vision.
At the beginning of the experiment, we collected information about each partic-
ipant’s sex, age (in years and months), and the number of formal education years.
At the end of the experiment, participants took a French version of the Mill-Hill
Vocabulary Scale (MHVS; Deltour, 1993) to asses their verbal ability. MHVS
mean scores diVered signiWcantly between young (22.7, SDD3.8) and older (26.8,
SDD4.8) participants, F(1,36)D16.33,  MSeD19. Participants also completed
both the addition and subtraction-multiplication subtests of the French Kit
(French, Ekstrom, & Price, 1963) to assess their arithmetic skills with an indepen-
dent paper-and-pencil test. Addition and subtraction-multiplication mean scores
diVered signiWcantly between young (73, SDD16.4) and older (100, SDD27.8) par-
ticipants (F(1,36)D 23.72, MSeD555). To ascertain that diVerences between
young and older adults’ subliminal priming were not due to possible diVerences in
lexical and arithmetic knowledge, arithmetic and vocabulary scores were treated as
covariates in the two experiments.
2.1.2. Design and procedure
The temporal predictability of the prime and target stimuli was manipulated fol-
lowing Naccache et al. (2002). Prime stimuli were presented for 43ms and targets
were presented in three diVerent conditions. In the Wrst condition, so called “Fixed
Prime and Fixed Target” (FPFT), prime and target had Wxed onsets. They appeared
1510 and 1624ms, respectively, after trial onset, yielding a prime-target SOA of
114ms (see Fig. 1). In the second condition, “Fixed Prime and Variable Tar-
get”(FPVT), the same trials as in the FPFT condition were mixed with two other
types of trials in which prime onset was kept Wxed at 1510ms after trial onset. Targets
appeared at 1974 or 2291ms after trial onset, yielding a prime-target SOA of 464 and
781ms. In the last condition, so called “Variable Prime and Fixed Target” (VPFT),
the same trials as in the FPFT condition were mixed with other types of trials in
which the prime onset varied (871 or 1226ms) while the target onset was Wxed at
1624ms after trial onset, yielding prime-target SOAs 753 and 398ms. The three con-
ditions were presented in separate sessions, and the order of session was the same518 L. Fabre et al. / Cognition 105 (2007) 513–532
across participants1 (i.e., participants Wrst performed the session with the FPFT con-
dition, after a break they performed the second session with the FPVT conditions
and then, after a break, the third session with VTFP condition). The experiment was
controlled by a Dell Pentium PC notebook, using E-Prime software.
2.1.3. Stimuli and tasks
Participants performed two tasks as quickly and accurately as possible, a parity
judgment task and a lexical decision task. The order of the two tasks was counterbal-
anced across participants and began with a practice block of 25 trials each. All stim-
uli were presented in a “24-point Courier-New” type font. For the parity judgment
task, participants had to decide whether target stimuli were “odd” or “even”. Primes
were verbal French numbers (e.g., “QUATRE”) and target stimuli were single-digit
Arabic numbers (e.g., “4”) between 2 and 9. Parity compatibility between primes and
targets was manipulated. Half the trials were congruent (i.e., primes and targets were
both even or both odd) and half the trials were incongruent (i.e., prime was even and
target odd, or the reverse). All participants saw 512 trials (in addition to 25 practice
trials): 128 trials in the FPFT condition (all combinations of 8 primes and 8 targets
which gave 64 trials presented twice), 192 trials in the FPVT condition (64 trials in
which prime and target, respectively, appeared 1510 and 1624ms after trial onset, 64
trials in which target appeared 1974ms after trial onset and 64 trials in which target
appeared 2291ms after trial onset) and 192 trials in the VPFT condition (64 trials in
which prime and target, respectively, appear 1510 and 1624ms after trial onset, 64
1 We tested 12 additional older adults balancing the three sessions across participants using a Latin
square, and we obtained the same patterns of results.
Fig. 1. Schematic depiction of the temporal structure of the experiment. Strings of six letters (e.g.,
HnKlpB) represent a pattern-mask presented for 71ms. A Wxation cross was presented for 800ms and
prime duration was 43ms and target duration 200ms. Statistical analyses were performed on exactly the
same trials indicated by a star shape (adapted from Naccache et al., 2002).
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trials in which prime appeared 871ms after trial onset, and 64 trials in which prime
appeared 1226ms after trial onset).
For the lexical decision task, target and prime stimuli were composed of 210 Wve-
letter French words (e.g., “PIANO”) and 210 non-words of 5 letters (e.g., “LICAL”).
For words, non repeated and repeated items were matched for length and frequency.
Task began with a practice block of 25 trials. Half the trials with French words were
repeated trials (i.e., primes and targets were the same words), and the other half were
unrepeated trials (i.e., primes and targets were diVerent words). Participants had to
press one of two response keys (‘L’ or ‘S’) on an AZERTY keyboard. Assignment of
Wngers to response alternatives was varied systematically across participants. Within
the practice block, the non-word string (e.g., “HnKlpB”) replaced the masked prime
stimulus. There were 60 trials (30 words with 15 related and 30 non-words) in the
FPFT condition, 180 trials in the FPVT condition (60 trials in which prime and tar-
get, respectively, appeared 1510 and 1624ms after trials onset, 60 trials in which tar-
get appeared 1974ms after trials onset and, 60 trials in which target appeared
2291ms after trials onset) and, 180 trials in the VPFT condition (60 trials in which
prime and target, respectively, appeared 1510 and 1624ms after trials onset, 60 trials
in which prime appeared 871ms after trials onset, and 60 trials in which prime
appeared 1226ms after trials onset).
2.1.4. Prime visibility
At the end of the main experiment, we assessed prime visibility using both objec-
tive and subjective measures. Any spontaneous comments of the participants were
noted. Then, participants were questioned about the presence of a prime stimulus.
Finally, participants were fully informed of the nature of the prime stimulus and were
asked to perform a forced-choice prime detection task designed to measure each par-
ticipant’s  d. In this block, participants were instructed to pay attention to the
masked prime stimulus and had to perform a parity judgment and semantic categori-
zation on this stimulus. The task was the same as in the FPFT condition. Subjective
measures revealed that the primes were largely invisible. During the task, none of
participants reported having perceived the masked prime. Objective measures of
prime visibility in the forced-choice task resulted in d scores for the judgment parity
task that were 0.14 and 0.16 for the young and older adults, respectively. For the lexi-
cal decision task, the resulting d scores were 0.09 and 0.13 for young and older par-
ticipants, respectively. These scores did not diVer signiWcantly from zero (all ps>.2). 2
2.2. Results and discussion
In the three experiments, a p value of .05 or less was deemed to indicate a signiW-
cant eVect. We analyzed RTs from the subset of trials that had exactly the same SOA
and prime and target onsets in the three conditions. For each participant, response
times greater or smaller than the means§2.5s were replaced by that individual’s
2 Each participants saw 60 trials in the lexical decision task and 64 trials in the parity judgment task.
dlexicalDz[p(word/word)]¡z[p(word/non-word)] and darithmeticD z[p(even/even)]¡z[p(even/odd)].520 L. Fabre et al. / Cognition 105 (2007) 513–532
mean response time (2.1% and 2.4% of trials in young and older participants, respec-
tively, for the judgment parity task and 2.3% and 2.6% of trials in young and older
participants, respectively, for the lexical decision task)3. The results of each task are
presented separately, and ANOVAs performed with participants (F1) and items (F2)
as random variables.
For the parity judgment task, the ANOVA factors were attention condition
(FPFT, FPVT or VPFT), prime condition (congruent or incongruent) as a within-
participants factor, age (young or older) as a between-participants factor, and arith-
metic scores of the French kit as a covariate. As can be seen from Table 1, we
observed a signiWcant age eVect  F1(1,71)D33.26,  MSeD30770;  F2(1,7)D965.2,
MSeD199. Young participants were 93ms faster than older adults. A priming eVect
was also observed F1(1,72)D47.4, MSeD358, which was not signiWcant by items,
F2(1,7)D1.6, MSeD14809. Participants responded faster to congruent trials (367ms)
than to incongruent trials (379ms; eVect sizeD12ms). Moreover two interactions
were signiWcant: Attention£Age  F1 (2,144)D4.04,  MSeD3436;  F2(1,7)D8.31,
MSeD122, and Age£Priming F1(1,72)D4.5, MSeD358; F2(1,7)D4.92, MSeD152.
No subliminal priming eVects were observed on unpredictable-target trials (i.e.,
FPVT condition). Subliminal priming eVects, characterized by faster RTs on congru-
ent trials than on incongruent trials, were present in the other two conditions, FPFT
(F1(1,36)D55.17,  MSeD7726, eVect sizeD21ms;  F2(1,7)D7.56,  MSeD101) and
VPFT (F1(1,36)D25.79, MSeD5224, eVect sizeD18ms; F2(1,7)D7.49, MSeD229)
for young participants but also in the FPFT condition (F1(1,36)D17.88, MSeD2138,
eVect sizeD14 ms; F2(1,7)D6.52, MSeD239) for older adults4. Our Wndings in young
participants replicate those of Naccache and colleagues’ (2002) and are consistent
with the hypothesis that unconscious prime processing depends on participant’s abil-
ity to focus their temporal attention on the time window when the target appears.
Moreover, our results show generally weaker priming eVects in older participants
3 Analyses with medians yielded the same patterns of results.
4 In the FPFT, analyses restricted to the non-repeated trials yielded the same patterns of results.
Table 1
Mean response times (ms) and percent errors in arithmetic categorical priming for young and older partic-
ipants as a function of attention condition and prime-target congruency (Experiment 1)
Note. CP, Congruent Prime; IP, Incongruent Prime; diVerenceDIP¡CP.
* p<.05.
Attention condition Response time Percent errors
CP IP DiVerence CP IP DiVerence
Fixed Prime and Fixed Target (FPFT) Young 320 341 21¤ 4.4 5.6 1.2
Older 405 419 14¤ 10.1 10.1 0.0
Fixed Prime and Variable Target (FPVT) Young 335 346 11 4.0 3.1 ¡0.9
Older 418 427 9 7.0 5.0 ¡2.0
Variable Prime and Fixed Target (VPFT) Young 300 318 18¤ 5.7 6.3 1.4
Older 424 426 2 4.6 4.3 ¡0.3L. Fabre et al. / Cognition 105 (2007) 513–532 521
that are no longer signiWcant in the VPFT condition. No priming eVects were signiW-
cant in the error data.
In the lexical decision task, the ANOVA factors were attention condition (FPFT,
FPVT, or VPFT), prime condition (repeated or unrepeated) as a within-participants
factor, age (young or older) as a between-participants factor, and MHVS scores as a
covariate factor. Like in the parity judgment task we found a general slowing eVect of
age. As can be seen from Table 2, young participants were 99ms faster than older
adults F1(1,71)D45.95, MSeD32663; F2(1,14)D168.1, MSeD3087. There was a sig-
niWcant eVect of attention condition, showing that participants responded faster in
the VPFT condition (447ms) than in the FPFT condition (504ms) than in the FPVT
condition (526ms), F1(2,144)D44.77,  MSeD5432;  F2(2,28)D3.38,  MSeD23188.
SigniWcant repetition priming eVects showed that participants responded faster to
repeated trials (447ms) than to non-repeated trials (537ms) F1(1,72)D313.93,
MSeD2861; F2(1,14)D23.46, MSeD14982. Both the 67ms priming eVect in young
adults and 103ms priming eVect in older adults, in the FPFT condition, were signiW-
cant (F1(1,36)D66.18, MSeD1234; F2(1,14)D11.11, MSeD4322; F1(1,36)D67.28,
MSeD2923; F2(1,14)D5.49, MSeD1490, respectively). In the FPVT, the 82ms prim-
ing eVect in young adults and 97ms priming eVect in older adults were also signiW-
cant (F1(1,36)D95.92, MSeD1294; F2(1,14)D19.17, MSeD3990; F1(1,36)D27.72,
MSeD6277; F2(1,14)D29.4, MSeD6002, respectively). Finally, in the VPFT condi-
tion, the 80ms priming eVect in young adults and 112ms priming eVect in older
adults were signiWcant (F1(1,36)D109.2, MSeD1065; F2(1,14)D6.68, MSeD2208;
F1(1,36)D126.9, MSeD1830;  F2(1,14)D7.06, MSeD2875, respectively). A signiW-
cant interaction was observed between age and priming, F1(1,72)D7.69, MSeD2861;
F2(1,14)D5.09, MSeD16126 indicating that the repetition priming eVect was smaller
in young (76ms) than in older adults (104ms). This interaction could be the result of
the larger overall reaction times in older adults. Most important, subliminal repeti-
tion priming was found to be independent of variations in prime or target onset in
the lexical decision task.
In sum, the results of Experiment 1 showed diVerences in the involvement of tem-
poral attention across lexical and arithmetic domains. However, these diVerences
Table 2
Mean response times (ms) and percent errors in lexical repetition priming for young and older partici-
pants as a function of attention condition and prime-target repetition (Experiment 1)
Note. RP, Repeated Prime; UP, Unrepeated Prime; diVerenceDUP¡RP.
* p<.05.
Attention condition Response time Percent errors
RP UP DiVerence RP UP DiVerence
Fixed Prime and Fixed Target (FPFT) Young 422 489 67¤ 18.6 17.2 ¡1.4
Older 501 604 103¤ 16.2 18.6 2.4
Fixed Prime and Variable Target (FPVT) Young 437 519 82¤ 8.1 14.1 6.0
Older 526 623 97¤ 8.7 14.5 5.8
Variable Prime and Fixed Target (VPFT) Young 356 436 80¤ 3.6 11.2 7.6
Older 443 555 112¤ 2.9 12 9.1522 L. Fabre et al. / Cognition 105 (2007) 513–532
could be due to the type of subliminal priming being confounded with domains (i.e.,
categorical priming in arithmetic domain and repetition priming in the lexical
domain). In Experiment 2 we examined subliminal categorical priming in the lexical
domain and repetition priming in the arithmetic domain.
3. Experiment 2
In Experiment 2 participants had to accomplish two tasks. The Wrst was a seman-
tic categorization task where participants had to say whether the target word was a
plant or an animal. The second was a numerical decision task where participants had
to say whether a target word was a number (e.g., two) or not (e.g., car). If attention is
only involved when primes have to be processed beyond simple nominal identity in
order to inXuence target processing, then subliminal priming eVects should be
observed in repetition priming in the numerical decision task independently of atten-
tional variations. Moreover, for categorical priming in the lexical domain, we pre-
dicted that subliminal priming eVects would be aVected by temporal attention.
3.1. Method
3.1.1. Participants
Twenty-four students with a mean age of 22.3 years (range: 19–25 y.o.) and 24
older participants with a mean age of 71.5 years (range: 55–79 y.o.) participated in
this experiment. Young adults were undergraduate students from the University of
Provence (Marseille, France) who received course credit for their participation and
older adults were recruited from the community. Older adults took the Mini-Mental
State Examination (MMSE, Folstein et al., 1975) for potential dementia screening.
All older individuals were included as they had MMSE scores higher than 27 (mean:
28.4). All participants had a normal or a corrected-to-normal vision.
Information about each participant (sex, age, and the number of years of formal
education) was collected. At the end of the experiment, participants took a French
version of the Mill-Hill Vocabulary Scale (MHVS; Deltour, 1993) and completed
both the addition and subtraction-multiplication subtests of the French Kit (French
et al., 1963). MHVS mean scores diVered signiWcantly between young (22.4, SDD3.5)
and older (27, SDD4) participants, F(1,23)D20.1, MSeD12. Addition and subtrac-
tion-multiplication mean scores diVered signiWcantly between young (69.5,
SDD11.8) and older (84, SDD21.9) participants (F(1,23)D12.7, MSeD277.3).
3.1.2. Stimuli and tasks
All stimuli were presented in a “24-point Courier-New” type font. For the semantic
categorization task two categories were used: Animals and Plants. For each category 28
exemplars were selected. Half the trials were congruent (i.e., primes and targets were
diVerent exemplars of the same category - both animals or both plants) and half the tri-
als were incongruent (i.e., prime was an animal and target a plant, or reverse). Partici-
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possible. Participants saw 392 trials (in addition to the 25 practice trials): 56 trials in the
FPFT condition (28 plants and 28 animals), 168 trials in the FPVT condition (56 trials
in which prime and target, respectively, appeared 1510 and 1624ms after trial onset, 56
trials in which targets appeared 1974ms after trial onset, and 56 trials in which targets
appeared 2291ms after trial onset), and 168 trials in the VPFT condition (56 trials in
which prime and target, respectively, appeared 1510 and 1624ms after trial onset, 56 tri-
als in which primes appeared 871ms after trial onset, and 56 trials in which primes
appeared 1226ms after trial onset). In the numerical decision task, target and prime
stimuli were composed of French words. Half the stimuli were verbal numbers between
two and nine, and the other half were common nouns. Repetition between primes and
targets was manipulated. Half the trials with verbal number targets were repeated trials
(i.e., same prime and target stimuli: “SIX” and “SIX”), and the other half were unre-
peated (i.e., diVerent prime and target stimuli: “BUT” and “SIX”). Each task began
with a practice block of 25 trials. Participants saw 448 trials (in addition to the 25 prac-
tice trials): 64 trials in the FPFT condition, 192 trials in the FPVT condition (64 trials in
which prime and target, respectively, appeared 1510 and 1624ms after trial onset, 64 tri-
als in which targets appeared 1974ms after trials onset and, 64 trials in which targets
appeared 2291ms after trial onset), and 192 trials in the VPFT condition (64 trials in
which prime and target, respectively, appeared 1510 and 1624ms after trial onset, 64 tri-
als in which primes appeared 871ms after trial onset, and 64 trials in which primes
appeared 1226ms after trial onset).Participants had to press one of two response keys
(‘L’ or ‘S’) on an AZERTY keyboard to say whether the target was a number word or
a non-number word. Assignment of Wngers to response alternatives was varied system-
atically across participants.
3.1.3. Design and procedure
The same design as in Experiment 1 was used. The two tasks (semantic categoriza-
tion and numerical decision tasks) and the three conditions (FPFT, FPVT and
VPFT) were balanced across participants using a Latin square design.
3.1.4. Prime visibility
The same measures as in Experiment 1 were collected to test prime visibility. Dur-
ing the main experiment, none of the participants reported perceiving masked primes.
Objective measures of prime visibility were obtained in the forced-choice tasks. The
resulting d scores for the numerical decision task were ¡0.04 for young participants
and 0.06 for older adults, and in the semantic categorization task the d scores were
0.18 for young participants and 0.2 for older adults (all ps>.2).
3.2. Results and discussion
As in Experiment 1, we analyzed RTs from the subset of trials that had exactly the
same SOA and prime and target onsets in the three conditions. For each participant,
response times greater or smaller than the mean §2.5s were replaced by that individ-
ual’s mean response time (2.3% and 2.4% of trials in young and older participants,
respectively, for the semantic categorization task, and 1.9% and 1.6% of trials in524 L. Fabre et al. / Cognition 105 (2007) 513–532
young and older participants, respectively, for the numerical decision task). We Wrst
report the results of the semantic categorization task.
RTs were analyzed with a mixed design ANOVA with attention condition (FPFT,
FPVT or VPFT), and prime condition (congruent or incongruent) as within-partici-
pants factors, age (young or older) as a between-participants factor, and MHVS
scores as a covariate. Young participants responded 199ms faster than older adults
F1(1,45)D6.3, MSeD386503; F2(1,27)D936.1, MSeD3617. The interaction between
attention condition and priming was signiWcant  F1(2,92)D6.19,  MSeD735.1;
F2(1,27)D7.42, MSeD5574. Subliminal categorical priming eVects were present only
in the FPFT condition (F1(1,23)D936.1, MSeD3617; F2(1,27)D6.56, MSeD2715,
eVect sizeD15ms) in young participants and (F1(1,23)D4.33,  MSeD1647;
F2(1,27)D5.49, MSeD6216, eVect sizeD24ms) in older participants (see Table 3).
Subliminal priming eVects were not observed in either the FPVT condition or the
VTFP for young or older adults.5
Next, we tested whether subliminal repetition priming in the numerical decision
task would be inXuenced by varying temporal attention. ANOVAs were performed
with attention condition (FPFT, FPVT or VPFT), priming (repeated or unrepeated)
as within-participants factors, age (young or older) as a between-participants factor,
and arithmetic scores of the French kit as a covariate. In the RT analysis, we
obtained a general slowing eVect of age. As can be seen from Table 4, young partici-
pants were 58ms faster than older participants, F1(1,45)D6.45,  MSeD56360;
F2(1,7)D539.7, MSeD207. Contrary to the categorical priming eVects, repetition
priming eVects were present in all the three attention conditions in both young and
older adults (see Table 4) F1(1,23)D95.42, MSeD1066; F2(1,7)D17.99, MSeD671.
In the FPFT condition, the 40ms priming eVect in young adults and 30ms priming
eVect in older adults were signiWcant (F1(1,23)D23.94, MSeD788; F2(1,7)D15.76,
MSeD308; F1(1,23)D5.2, MSeD2020; F2(1,7)D12.31, MSeD423, respectively). In
the FPVT condition, the 36ms priming eVect in young adults and 53ms priming
5 The same outcomes were observed in all three conditions in ANOVAs not including congruent-repeat-
ed items (e.g., SIX-6).
Table 3
Mean response times (ms) and percent errors in lexical categorical priming for young and older partici-
pants as a function of attention condition and prime-target congruency (Experiment 2)
Note. CP, Congruent Prime; IP, Incongruent Prime; diVerenceDIP¡CP.
¤ p<.01.
Attention condition Response time Percent errors
CP IP DiVerence CP IP DiVerence
Fixed Prime and Fixed Target (FPFT) Young 497 512 15¤ 5.4 5.8 0.4
Older 716 740 24¤ 6 9.3 3.3
Fixed Prime and Variable Target (FPVT) Young 569 565 ¡4 5.4 8.8 3.4
Older 733 743 10 5.5 8.2 2.7
Variable Prime and Fixed Target (VPFT) Young 534 532 ¡2 7.3 7.6 0.3
Older 745 732 ¡12 6.1 7.3 1.2L. Fabre et al. / Cognition 105 (2007) 513–532 525
eVect in older adults were signiWcant (F1(1,23)D24.54,  MSeD587; F2(1,7)D7.98,
MSeD105;  F1(1,23)D50.67,  MSeD674;  F2(1,7)D9.34,  MSeD858, respectively).
Finally, in the VPFT condition, the 34ms priming eVect in young adults and 35ms
priming eVect in older adults, for the FPFT condition, were signiWcant
(F1(1,23)D27.5, MSeD488; F2(1,7)D9.76, MSeD439; F1(1,23)D19.3, MSeD758;
F2(1,27)D15.53,  MSeD487, respectively). No signiWcant interactions between
Age£Priming were observed in each attentional condition. These results suggest
that unconscious priming was independent of whether or not participants allocated
attention to the prime-target pairs for repetition priming eVects in the arithmetic
domain.
In sum, Experiments 1 and 2 tested masked repetition and categorical priming
eVects in both number and word stimuli and showed that subliminal priming eVects
do not always depend on temporal attention. However, these experiments did not
directly compare congruent, incongruent, and repeated trials within a single task and
experiment. Experiment 3 was designed to rectify this, and therefore to provide stron-
ger evidence for the diVerential inXuence of temporal attention on repetition and cat-
egorical priming.
4. Experiment 3
The results of Experiments 1 and 2 support the idea that certain types of sublimi-
nal priming (i.e., categorical priming) depend upon temporal attention. Experiment 3
was designed to compare repetition and categorical priming within a single task
under various conditions of temporal attention. Participants performed the same
semantic categorization task as in Experiment 2, with repeated, congruent, and
incongruent priming conditions. On the basis of the Wndings of the two previous
experiments, we predicted that subliminal repetition priming eVects (i.e., RTs for con-
gruent – RTs for repeated trials) should be observed independently of attentional
variations in contrast to subliminal categorical priming (i.e., RTs for congruent –
RTs for incongruent trials) that should be aVected by temporal attention. However,
Table 4
Mean response times (ms) and percent errors in arithmetic repetition priming for young and older partici-
pants as a function of attention condition and prime-target repetition (Experiment 2)
Note. RP, Repeated Prime; UrP, Unrepeated Prime; diVerenceD UrP¡RP.
¤ p<.05.
Attention condition Response time Percent errors
RP UrP DiVerence RP UrP DiVerence
Fixed Prime and Fixed Target (FPFT) Young 338 378 40¤ 2.6 2.6 0
Older 436 466 30¤ 6.4 6.3 ¡0.1
Fixed Prime and Variable Target (FPVT) Young 374 410 36¤ 3.3 1.8 ¡1.5
Older 404 457 53¤ 5.6 5.2 ¡0.4
Variable Prime and Fixed Target (VPFT) Young 372 406 34¤ 4.1 4.2 0.1
Older 412 447 35¤ 6.1 4.2 ¡1.9526 L. Fabre et al. / Cognition 105 (2007) 513–532
although repetition priming eVects (measured over and above categorical priming)
have been systematically reported in number priming studies (Naccache & Dehaene,
2001; Naccache et al., 2002), this was not the case in the semantic categorization
experiments of Dell’Acqua and Grainger (1999). These authors found no advantage
for the repetition condition relative to the congruent priming condition when partici-
pants had to categorize targets as living things versus artefacts. Therefore, the strong
prediction for Experiment 3 is that repetition priming eVects should only emerge
against a categorical priming background in conditions known to diminish categori-
cal priming eVects but to have no inXuence on repetition priming eVects – that is in
conditions of variable target presentation (FPVT).
4.1. Method
4.1.1. Participants
Twenty students with a mean age of 23.6 years (range: 20–27 y.o.) were tested in a
lexical semantic categorization task. Participants were undergraduate students from
the University of Provence (Marseille, France) who received course credit for their
participation.
4.1.2. Stimuli and task
All stimuli were presented in “24-point Courier-New” font. Two categories of words
were used, animals and plants. For each category, 30 exemplars were selected. Each tar-
get stimulus was primed by the same word (repeated trials), a diVerent word from the
same category (congruent trials), or a word from a diVerent category (incongruent tri-
als). Prime-target pairing was counterbalanced across three diVerent lists such that each
target was tested in all three priming conditions. The critical set of 60 target stimuli was
repeated three times (the three diVerent lists) to each participant in the three attention
conditions. Thus, participants saw 300 trials (in addition to the 25 practice trials): 60 tri-
als in the FPFT condition (30 plants and 30 animals), 120 trials in the FPVT condition
(60 trials in which prime and target appeared 1510 and 1624ms, respectively, after trial
onset, 30 trials in which targets appeared 1974ms after trial onset, and 30 trials in which
targets appeared 2291ms after trial onset), and 120 trials in the VPFT condition (60 tri-
als in which prime and target appeared 1510 and 1624ms, respectively, after trial onset,
30 trials in which primes appeared 871ms after trial onset, and 30 trials in which primes
appeared 1226ms after trial onset). Participants had to categorize words as “animals”
or “plants” as quickly and accurately as possible by pressing one of two response keys
(‘L’ or ‘S’) on an AZERTY keyboard. Assignment of Wngers to response alternatives
was varied systematically across participants. The order of presentation of the three
attention conditions (FPFT, FPVT, and VPFT) was counterbalanced across partici-
pants using a Latin square design.
4.1.3. Prime visibility
The same measures as in Experiments 1 and 2 were collected to test prime visibil-
ity. During the main experiment none of the participants reported perceiving masked
primes. Objective measures of prime visibility were obtained using a forced-choiceL. Fabre et al. / Cognition 105 (2007) 513–532 527
procedure as in the previous experiments. The average d score was 0.08 and no par-
ticipants had a d that diVered signiWcantly from zero (all ps>.2).
4.2. Results and discussion
We analyzed RTs from the subset of trials that had exactly the same SOA and
prime and target onsets in the three conditions. For each participant, response times
greater or smaller than the mean §2.5s were replaced by that individual’s mean
response time (3.2%).
The RT data were entered in an ANOVA with attention condition (FPFT, FPVT
or VPFT) and prime condition (repeated, congruent or incongruent) as within-par-
ticipants factors. Participants responded faster to repeated (428ms) trials than to
congruent (438ms) trials and slowest to incongruent (454ms) trials (F1(2,38)D16.84,
MSeD574; F2(2,118)D19.03, MSeD1657). Categorical priming eVects were present
in the FPFT condition (F1 (1,19)D11.73, MSeD354; F2(1,59)D6.59, MSeD2095,
eVect sizeD21ms) and in the VPFT condition (F1 (1,19)D9.32,  MSeD415;
F2(1,59)D11.75,  MSeD1623, eVect sizeD20ms), but not in the FPVT condition
(Fs<1) (see Table 5). Repetition priming eVects, measured by contrasting RTs from
repeated trials with those from congruent non-repeated trials, were present only in
the FPVT condition (F1 (1,19)D8.57, MSeD566; F2(1,59)D9.11, MSeD1790, eVect
sizeD23ms) (see Table 5).
Experiment 3 directly compared repetition and categorical priming in the same
task and with the same materials. These results lend further support to the idea that
categorical priming eVects are dependent on attentional processes and tend to vanish
under conditions of temporal inattention. These results also support the idea that
unconscious repetition priming does not depend on whether or not participants can
allocate attention to the precise moment in time that prime-target pairs appear.
The results of Experiment 3 show that in conditions that allow accurate allocation
of attention (i.e., the FT conditions), then there is no additional beneWt of a repetition
prime relative to a congruent prime. This replicates the results of Dell’Acqua and
Grainger (1999), also obtained with a semantic categorization task, but with picture
Table 5
Mean response times (ms) and percent errors in the diVerent attention and priming conditions tested in
Experiment 3
Note. FPFT, Fixed Prime and Fixed Target; FPVT, Fixed Prime and Variable target; VPFT, Variable
Prime and Fixed Target; IP, Incongruent Prime; CP, Congruent Prime; RP: Repeated Prime; Categorical
priming eVects D IP-CP; Repetition priming eVectsDCP¡RP.
¤ p<.05.
Attention condition Response time Percent errors
Priming Priming eVects Priming Priming eVects
IP CP RP Categorical Repetition IP CP RP Categorical Repetition
FPFT 472 451 445 21¤ 62 1 . 9 0 . 9 0 . 1 1
FPVT 440 435 412 5 23¤ 1.6 1.3 1.3 0.3 0
VPFT 448 428 425 20¤ 31 1 . 3 1 . 3 ¡0.3 0528 L. Fabre et al. / Cognition 105 (2007) 513–532
primes and either picture or word targets. Furthermore, Dell’Acqua and Grainger
found the same pattern when participants had to name picture targets, therefore
demonstrating that it was unlikely to be the result of low-level stimulus-response
mappings that could be operational in a semantic categorization task. The present
study adds the important Wnding that in conditions where categorical priming disap-
pears (i.e., in the FPVT condition), repetition priming persists. This diVerential sensi-
tivity to temporal attention suggests that fundamentally diVerent mechanisms
underlie these two types of priming.
5. General discussion
The present study aimed at furthering our understanding of the cognitive pro-
cesses underlying subliminal priming eVects, and the role of stimulus-related factors
(stimulus domain), attentional factors, and participant-related factors (age) in such
priming. Regarding mechanisms involved in subliminal priming, our Wndings showed
priming eVects for each participant group in the two domains (arithmetical and lexi-
cal) and for two types of subliminal priming eVects (i.e., repetition and categorical).
Repetition priming eVects were systematically insensitive to manipulations of tempo-
ral attention. Categorical priming eVects, on the other hand, disappeared when target
onset varied in the FPVT conditions, thereby replicating and conWrming the role of
temporal attention in categorical subliminal priming originally reported by Naccache
et al. (2002).
Our results therefore provide further evidence that certain types of subliminal
priming eVects do depend upon temporal attention. The inXuence of attention in sub-
liminal priming is not totally consistent with the fact that unconscious access to
abstract representational levels of processing is passive and automatic (Eysenck,
1984; Posner & Snyder, 1975; Schneider & ShiVrin, 1977). Naccache et al.’s (2002)
Wndings did not specify the boundary conditions for which masked primes require
attention in order to exert an eVect. Our results suggest that depth of processing may
be crucial. Categorical priming, whether it be with numbers or words, requires access
to information beyond simple nominal identity. Semantic information must be used
to access appropriate category information that forms the basis of observed priming
eVects (Reynvoet et al., 2005; Naccache & Dehaene, 2001). Our results suggest that
non-semantic lexical properties could be processed independently of temporal atten-
tion in contrast to semantic properties of stimuli. In line with this possibility, Hol-
comb, Reder, Misra, and Grainger (2005) showed that the size of masked repetition
priming, as reXected in a modulation of the N400 ERP component, did not correlate
with prime awareness, whereas the size of semantic priming eVects did.
Our categorical priming conditions replicate Naccache et al. (2002) showing a
modulation of priming eVects as a function of whether or not participants can allo-
cate attention to the precise moment of time when the prime stimulus is present. This
is clearly most likely to be the case when targets are predictable (the FT conditions)
and primes are presented in close temporal proximity to targets. However, having a
variable prime onset and Wxed target onset (VPFT) tended to eliminate priming inL. Fabre et al. / Cognition 105 (2007) 513–532 529
the present study, as can be seen in the results of the older participants in Experiment
1 and of both groups of participants in Experiment 2. This particular result suggests
that allocation of temporal attention is also sensitive to relevant subliminal stimuli as
well as clearly visible stimuli. Our subliminal prime stimuli appear also to have
attracted a certain amount of attention, such that when prime stimuli appear at vari-
able intervals (VPFT condition) allocation of attention is less precise than in the Wxed
prime condition (FPFT). Therefore, having both primes and targets appearing at
Wxed intervals (FPFT) would optimize attentional allocation to the appropriate time
window and maximize categorical priming eVects.
The clearest pattern was found in Experiment 3 using a single task and comparing
eVects of congruent, incongruent, and repeated primes on the same set of targets. In
this experiment, categorical priming was present in the Wxed target conditions and
disappeared when targets appeared at variable intervals. In the Wxed target condi-
tions, repetition priming eVects were not signiWcantly greater than categorical prim-
ing, thus replicating the prior work of Dell’Acqua and Grainger (1999). However,
when this baseline of categorical priming disappeared (i.e., in the FPVT condition),
repetition priming eVects were still present, hence once again demonstrating that they
are robust in conditions that prohibit precise allocation of temporal attention.
Our results therefore show a clear distinction in attentional inXuences on sublimi-
nal priming as a function of the nature of this priming. In subliminal repetition prim-
ing, priming eVects may involve only automatic processes, such as the pre-activation
of a given lexical representation by the prime stimulus, which would then facilitate
target processing. In subliminal categorical priming, priming eVects would depend
upon further processing beyond nominal identity, such as processing the semantic
properties of prime stimuli. In this case, prime processing could be inXuenced by non-
automatic attentional processes. One possibility is that attentional resource recruit-
ment is a sign that information about the prime has “escaped” from the lexical pro-
cessing system, and is consequently available to higher-order processing systems (see
for a review Forster, Mohan, & Hector, 2003). Our results leave open the possibility
that non-semantic lexical properties could be processed independently of attention in
contrast to semantic properties.
However, our subliminal repetition priming results do not Wt with Naccache
et al.’s (2002) Wndings. These authors observed a signiWcant repetition priming eVect
in the attended condition (i.e., FPFT) that vanished in the unattended condition. One
possible reason for this discrepancy is that there were more target stimuli in the pres-
ent experiments than in Naccache et al. This suggests that when there are only a few
over-repeated target stimuli, any form of priming seems to depend on temporal
attention (as in Naccache et al., 2002; in the present parity judgment task of Experi-
ment 1 or in the semantic categorization task of Experiment 2). When there are larger
sets of stimuli, priming may not depend on temporal attention (lexical decision in
Experiment 1 and numerical decision in Experiment 2). With over-repeated target
stimuli, participants’ strategies might involve less lexical processing and more stimu-
lus-response mapping. As shown by Naccache and Dehaene (2001), even if priming
with over-repeated numbers is partly semantically driven, a large part of the eVect is
due to stimulus-response mapping.530 L. Fabre et al. / Cognition 105 (2007) 513–532
Lachter, Forster, and RuthruV (2004) tested the inXuence of spatial attention on
masked repetition priming in the lexical decision task. In their experiments, a prime
word was presented either at a location that was presumably attended or at an unat-
tended location. The prime world could be either identical (i.e., repeated trials) or
unrelated to a subsequent target stimulus. Their Wndings showed repetition priming
eVects only in the attended prime condition (see Dupoux, Kouider, & Mehler, 2003,
for a similar result with dichotic priming in the auditory domain). This result has
since been replicated with letter stimuli and an alphabetic decision (letter / non-letter
discrimination) task (Marzouki, Grainger, & Theeuwes (submitted)). Letter identiW-
cation was only facilitated by repetition priming when attention was oriented toward
the appropriate location. The apparent discrepancy between these Wndings and the
present results concerning repetition priming, could well be due to two fundamen-
tally diVerent attentional mechanisms – endogenous attention in the present study,
and exogenous attention in the spatial cueing manipulations of Lachter et al. (2004).
Exogenous attention reXects automatic attentional capture, whereas endogenous
attention reXects more controlled attentional orienting. Furthermore, spatial atten-
tion is not the same as temporal attention. Knowing where to attend might be rather
diVerent from knowing when to attend.
Concerning aging eVects in subliminal priming, our results replicated subliminal
priming eVects in repetition priming (Karayanidis et al., 1993) and in categorical
priming (Fabre & Lemaire, 2005). Older adults were slower than young participants
in Experiment 1 and 2. This result could be the sign of a general cognitive slowing
(see  Salthouse, 1996). However, subliminal priming eVects were present in older
adults. Then, one hypothesis is that this slowing could be due to a diminution of
peripheral processes, such as encoding or responding. Subliminal priming eVects were
observed in all FPFT conditions and in FPVT and VPFT conditions for repetition
priming in older adults. Attentional inXuences on priming eVects in older adults fol-
lowed the pattern observed in young adults: Subliminal priming eVects disappeared
in the FPVT for categorical priming. Why were priming eVects observed in VPFT
conditions in the arithmetic domain for young adults and not for older adults? This
diVerence could be due to an age-related general cognitive slowing (see, Duchek &
Balota, 1993; Myerson, Hale, WagstaV, Poon, & Smith, 1990; Salthouse, 1996). This
mental slowing with increased age could inXuence the activation process and diVer-
entially aVect higher-order processing such as semantic processes. When temporal
attention is manipulated (i.e., in the VPFT), higher-order processes could be slower
and not executed to completion (i.e., no semantic properties were activated). As a
consequence, target processing would not be facilitated by prime processing. Alterna-
tively, older participants had more eye-blinks than young participants. Blinking more
often could easily unmask some of the primes and therefore lead participants to
become conscious of the variable prime onsets, therefore lowering their attentional
focus on the Wxed target condition.
Testing two priming eVects (i.e., repetition priming and categorical priming) in two
diVerent domains (i.e., arithmetic and lexical) in young and older adults, we found
that attentional inXuences on subliminal priming eVects depend on the nature of the
priming eVect. Categorical priming was aVected by temporal attention whereasL. Fabre et al. / Cognition 105 (2007) 513–532 531
repetition proming was not. We hypothesize that categorical priming requires deeper
processing of prime stimuli and arguably the involvement of non-automatic pro-
cesses, and it is such non-automatic processes that are inXuenced by attention. The
view of two processes in subliminal priming (i.e., automatic and non-automatic) fol-
lows from the distinction drawn by Naccache et al. between sources and eVects of
conscious control, or the hypothesis of a global neuronal workspace underlying con-
scious eVort (Dehaene, Kerszberg, & Changeux, 1998; Dehaene & Naccache, 2001).
This mechanism predicts that once a stream of processing is prepared consciously by
the instruction context, a subliminal prime may beneWt from this conscious setting,
and therefore show attentional ampliWcation.
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